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Abstract 
This paper critically discusses mixed methods research. A case is first offered as to 
why it is relevant for physical therapists to engage with the mixing of quantitative and 
qualitative methods and engage in debates about the intermingling of these 
techniques. Next, to provide a context for critical discussion several paradigms are 
outlined. Following this, two positions on mixed methods research are discussed. 
These are a pragmatist position and a purist position. The paper closes by suggesting 
that physical therapy researchers consider adopting the role of a connoisseur in order 
to engage with the critical issues emerging in mixed method research. 
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For the first time in its four editions, The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011a) recently dedicated a chapter to mixed methods. 
According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), mixed methods research is a type of 
research that includes collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. For example, within physical 
therapy, Camp, Appleton, and Reid (2000) used a close-ended survey and semi-
structured interviews to examine the impact of a structured pulmonary rehabilitation 
program on quality-of-life with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Moreover, 
Rauscher and Greenfield (2009), along with Shaw, Connelly, and Zecevic (2010) 
offered an argument for the place of mixed methods research as an effective means of 
supporting evidence-based practice in physical therapy.  
According to Rauscher and Greenfield (2009) mixed methods research in 
physical therapy is valuable because of the high-quality inferences it yields and the 
overall complexity revealed. For them, the strength of mixing qualitative methods 
with quantitative methods also lies in its ability to cross-validate results and offset the 
limitations of using only one methodological approach. Moreover, physical therapy is 
a health care profession responsible for restoring function in patients who frequently 
present complex movement impairments that are influenced by ongoing social and 
personal factors. As such, for Rauscher and Greenfield, “mixed methods research 
provides physical therapists with opportunities to broaden their scope and depth of 
understanding patients’ illness, injury, and rehabilitation” (p. 92). Similarly, and more 
recently, Shaw et al. (2010) proposed that mixed methods research can provide 
research evidence that integrates the multiple concerns and practice paradigms of a 
physical therapy “clinician better than either qualitative or quantitative methodology 
in isolation” (p. 511).  
 4 
It would seem, then, that researchers in physical therapy would do well to turn 
to mixed methods research and get the best of ‘both worlds’. If combining two 
methods produces higher quality research than one, mixing qualitative with 
quantitative methods is the obvious direction to take. More is better. However, is it? Is 
the mixing of methods this straightforward? The purpose of this paper is to offer a 
critical discussion of mixed methods research. This is of significant relevance, we 
believe, for physical therapists at this point in time. Within physical therapy there 
have been increasing calls for mixed methods research (e.g., Rauscher & Greenfield, 
2009). Yet, although there are critical discussions on this kind of research outside 
physical therapy, within the physical therapy literature they are relatively rare. What 
papers there are on mixed methods instead largely aim to provide a rationale for the 
place of mixing quantitative and qualitative methods in physical therapy and celebrate 
it. This is not to say there is complete critical silence on this kind of research (e.g., 
Shaw et al., 2010). On the rare occasions when critiques of mixed methods are 
presented within the physical therapy literature they are mostly cursory. What is 
therefore needed within physical therapy is work that delves deeply into the critical 
waters of mixed methods and asks questions of this kind of research along the way. 
This is not to argue against mixed methods research. Rather, it is to say that without 
critical discussion there is a risk of simply (re)producing a celebratory discourse on 
mixing methods and, in turn, overlooking critical and complex matters that need to be 
engaged with to develop our understandings of mixing methods. 
Engaging in critical discussion of mixed methods within physical therapy is 
also highly relevant for the future of qualitative research. As Denzin (2009, 2010) 
suggested, the increasing emphasis in universities and by governments on science-
based research (SBR), or what is also known as science, technology, engineering, and 
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mathematics research (STEM), has meant that quantitative methods are often elevated 
above qualitative methods. For example, the ‘gold standard’ or ‘best’ study design for 
evaluating interventions is deemed to be the randomized control trial (RCT). The term 
‘best’, of course, implies a hierarchy of methods and the focus often continues to be 
placed on RCT’s. Likewise, consider the words of the Primary care editor of the 
British Medical Journal (BMJ). 
My first impression, and I risk a flood of angry rapid responses, is to ask how 
much more qualitative work we need in this field. While we do publish 
qualitative studies in the BMJ, we look for works that give particular insights 
that add significantly to current knowledge and are of importance to our 
general clinical readership. To use a term from the qualitative literature, I 
think we may have reached saturation. Qualitative research, in particular, has 
been very successful in raising awareness of suffering and helped our 
understanding of the human and personal dimension – there have been very 
important insights. We now need to look at what we can do about it-measuring 
the effectiveness of interventions. (Domhnall Macauley, Primary care editor, 
BMJ, 19 April 2011, cited in Audrey, 2011). 
For Denzin (2009, 2010), like us (e.g., Smith, 2010; Sparkes & Smith, 2009; 
forthcoming; Phoenix, 2010; Phoenix & Smith, 2011) and others (e.g., Hesse-Biber, 
2010; Lincoln, 2010), the elevation of quantitative methods above qualitative methods 
– and the underestimation of the scope and contribution of qualitative research - 
should not mean that qualitative researchers adopt a victim narrative. It doesn’t call 
for us to wallow in a belief that our work is misunderstood by all natural scientists. 
Nor however should the elevation of quantitative methods above qualitative methods 
mean that qualitative researchers inevitably jump into bed with quantitative 
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researchers and immediately offer our services to do mixed methods research. This is 
because, as Denzin warned, there is the danger that qualitative research is reduced to 
being a servant of SBR or STEM work. There is likewise the risk of the terms of the 
conversation being set by those who are not experts in qualitative research. As such, 
Denzin proposed, qualitative researchers need to take responsibility themselves by not 
only doing high quality qualitative research per se, but also engaging in critical 
dialogue about mixed methods work. The voices of researchers working within the 
field of physical therapy, we would suggest, should be part of any dialogue on mixed 
methods.  
A critical consideration of mixed methods 
Set against this background, in what follows we first contextualize the critical 
discussion on mixed methods by describing various paradigms. Next, two positions 
on mixed methods – pragmatism and purism - are outlined and critically discussed 
with reference to paradigmatic assumptions. We conclude by suggesting that mixed 
methods research should continue, but for it to develop in nuanced ways researchers 
within physical therapy need to engage more with some complex issues. 
Paradigms: From post-positivism, to critical realism, to interpretivism, to critical 
participatory inquiry 
The whole issue of mixed method research is highly contested. This has led to 
heated debates across a number of disciplines. At the heart of this contestation is the 
commensurability question surrounding paradigms. As commonly used in the 
methods and methodology literature, a paradigm is a “set of basic beliefs (or 
metaphysics) ... a worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of the ‘world’, the 
individual’s place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its 
parts” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p.107). At the most general level, there are various 
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paradigms, that is, worldviews that guide action. These include 1) post-positivism; 2) 
critical realism; 3) interpretivism, or what is at times called constructionism; and 4) 
critical participatory inquiry. Importantly, the basic beliefs of each paradigm require 
researchers to respond to some fundamental questions concerned with ontology (What 
kind of being is the human being? What is the nature of reality?) and epistemology 
(What is the relationship between the inquirer and the known?) (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2005). Methods, in contrast, denote the practical means by which data are identified, 
collected, and analyzed. Drawing on Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba (2011), Schwandt 
(1997), Smith (1989, 1993, 2009), Smith and Deemer (2000), and Sparkes and Smith 
(forthcoming), we now describe the various paradigms and in so doing highlight 
differences between them.  
Post-positivism refers to a paradigm that responds to the ontological question 
by adopting subtle realism and epistemological questions regarding the nature of the 
relationship between the knower or would-be knower by adopting a modified 
dualist/objectivist epistemology. In terms of ontology, post-postitivism refers to the 
assumption that there is an external reality that can be (probabilistically) 
apprehendable. That is, a single reality exists and there is a real world externally out 
there independent of our interest in or knowledge of that world. This is a world that 
can be known, at least in principle, approximately as it really is. The reality is ‘out 
there’, external to the researcher, existing prior to his or her interest in it, awaiting 
discovery. It imposes itself on individual consciousness from without, and is driven 
by immutable natural laws and mechanisms that can never be fully apprehended, only 
approximated. The goal of quantitative research informed by post-positivism is, 
therefore, to formulate rules beyond time and space in order to control and predict as 
best as possible. The aspiration is for theory-free knowledge.  
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A dualist and objectivist position refers to the assumption that the researcher 
and the researched ‘object’ are independent entities, and that the researcher is capable 
of studying the object without influencing it or being influenced by it. That is, the 
knower can stand outside of what is to be known, values can be suspended in order to 
understand, and ‘true objectivity’ or something very close to it is possible as long as 
the researcher adopts a distant, detached, non-interactive posture, as if looking at the 
world through a one-way mirror. To reduce or eliminate then the potential dangers of 
values introducing ‘bias’ to the proceedings, quantitative researchers, advocate the use 
of technical procedures, as these are neutral and objective. Post-positivism adopts a 
modified version of this dualist and objectivist position described in that dualism is 
largely abandoned as not possible to maintain, but objectivity remains a ‘regulatory 
ideal’ and replicated findings are deemed probably true. 
Critical realism, or what is more loosely referred to as neorealism, is like post-
positivism in that it responds to ontological questions by announcing that there is a 
real world out there independent of our interest in, or knowledge of that world that 
can be known as it really is - at least in principle (in critical realism this is termed 
transcendental realism). As Denzin and Lincoln (2011b) commented, “Critical realists 
agree with the positivist that there is a world of events out there that is observable and 
independent of human consciousness” (p. 11). However, as they also suggested, they 
disagree with the positivists on an epistemological level when they commit to the 
belief that “Knowledge about this world is socially constructed” (p. 11). In this sense, 
critical realism believes in a subjectivist and constructionist epistemology. That is, 
there can be no separation of the researcher and the researched. Values inescapably 
mediate and shape what is understood. The knower and the known are interdependent 
and fused together in such a way that the ‘findings’ are the creation of the process of 
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interaction between the two. Our practices, hypotheses, and background knowledge 
all strongly shape what we know and how. Therefore, unlike those researchers who 
adopt a dualist and an objectivist position, researchers who commit to a 
constructionist epistemology believe there can be no theory-free knowledge and we 
have to live with this as finite beings.   
In contrast to post-positivism, but like critical realism, interpretivism 
subscribes to a subjectivist and constructionist epistemology. However, the 
interpretivists also differ from both the post-positivists and critical realists in terms of 
how they answer ontological questions. For qualitative researchers who commit to 
interpretivism, there is a belief in an internal/relativist view of reality. That is, 
ontologically interpretivists conceive social reality as multiple, subjective, and 
existing in the form of mental and discursive constructions. This however does not 
mean that the interpretivists reject any notion of a physical world out there 
independent of them. In a very common sense way, the interpretivists accept that 
there is a real material world. But, as Smith (1989) noted, whilst physical things do 
exist independent of ourselves, interpretivists stress the mind plays a foundational role 
in the shaping or constructing of social reality, and therefore what exists “is not 
independent of, but in a very significant sense is dependent on our minds” (p. 74). 
Again, let us be clear. This does not mean that the mind ‘creates’ the world of objects 
or what people say or what people do. Rather, it means that how we give meaning to 
objects and how we interpret the movements and utterances of other people in terms 
of the motivations and meanings we assign to them are shaped by the determining 
categories of the mind and our discursive resources. As Rorty (1989) put it: 
We need to make a distinction between the claim that the world is out there 
and the claim that truth is out there. To say that the world is out there, that it is 
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not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and 
time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To 
say that truth is not our there is simply to say that where there are no sentences 
there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that 
human languages are human creations (pp. 4-5). 
This issue is well illustrated by Dingwell (1992) in his reflections on the 
notion of disease. 
This point is important in understanding the boundaries between social and 
natural scientific studies in medicine. There are no diseases in nature, merely 
relationships between organisms ... Diseases are produced by the conceptual 
schemes imposed on the natural world by human beings, which value some 
states of the body and disvalue others. This is not to say that biological 
changes may not impose themselves on us, but rather that the significance of 
those changes depends upon their location in human society. The normal 
physiology of ageing is relevant in very different ways to an East African 
herdsman who sees it as a mark of advancing status, power and sexual 
attractiveness and to a Californian actress who sees it as the beginning of her 
decline as a social being. (p. 165) 
Accordingly, unlike post-positivism and critical realism, interpretivism 
assumes both an internal/relativist view of reality and a constructionist epistemology. 
Further, in interpretivism, the process of inquiry is a matter of interpreting the 
interpretations of others. The aim of research is to focus on the particular ways in 
which people construct their meanings of a given phenomenon, seeking to expand the 
understanding of the phenomenon through the individual case. The job of qualitative 
researchers who subscribe to interpretivism is to acknowledge and report these 
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different realities, relying on the voices and interpretations of the participants through 
extensive quotes, presenting themes that ‘reflect’ the words and actions of the 
participants, and advance evidence of different perspectives on each theme. 
Finally, critical participatory inquiry adopts a belief in constructionist 
epistemology. Thus, this paradigm differs from post-positivism, but is similar to 
interpretivism and critical realism. What separates critical participatory inquirers from 
the interpretivist and critical realist inquirers is that some commit to a 
dualist/objective/transcendental ontology whereas others believe in an 
internal/relativist view of reality. Moreover, for critical researchers, achieving a 
correct understanding of individuals’ meanings is only a necessary preliminary to 
social inquiry and not the whole substance of their theoretical enterprise. They argue 
that to focus only on the subjective meanings of action tends to imply that social 
reality is nothing over and above the way people perceive themselves and their 
situation. However, for them, social reality is not simply structured by concepts and 
ideas but is also structured and shaped by historical forces as well as economic and 
material conditions. Importantly, these things also structure and affect the perceptions 
and ideas of individuals so that ‘reality’ may be misperceived as a consequence of the 
operation of various ideological processes. Thus, uncovering these processes and 
explaining how they can condition and constrain interpretations of reality are vital 
requirements. As such, critical researchers see much qualitative research as suffering 
from ‘macro blindness’ in that it tends to ignore the unequal power the relationships 
within which people operate when their realities are constructed in terms of social 
class, gender, sexual orientation, disability, race, ethnicity, and religion, and so tells 
us little about how individual and group behaviour is influenced by the way that 
society is organized. In this regard, the central line of tension between critical 
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researchers and other forms of inquiry that are informed by interpretivism is in the 
call to action. This call might be in terms of internal (individual) transformation or 
external social transformation 
Indeed, the key difference that separates critical participatory inquiry from the 
other interpretivism, as well as the other two paradigms, lies in the researchers 
explicit goals to generate social change and emancipate. As Schwandt (1997) noted, a 
critical social science aims to integrate theory and practice in such a way that 
“individuals and groups become aware of the contradictions and distortions in their 
belief systems and social practices and are then inspired to change those beliefs and 
practices” (p. 24). For him, this critical social science is also practical and normative 
and not merely descriptive. It rejects the possibility of a disinterested social scientist 
and “is orientated toward social and individual transformation” (p. 24).  
While there are a number of critical theories that inform the critical paradigm, 
another core idea is that knowledge is structured by existing sets of social relations. 
The aim of a critical methodology is to provide knowledge which engages the 
prevailing social structures. These social structures are seen by critical researchers, in 
one way or another, as oppressive structures. As such, one of the central intentions of 
critical is emancipation. That is, enabling people to gain the knowledge and power to 
be in control of their own life. Thus, the language and intent of this approach is 
overtly political, and seeks to dig beneath the surface of historically specific, 
oppressive, social structures to focus on moments of domination, ideology, 
hegemony, and emancipation in social life with a view to instigating both individual 
and social change.   
Mixed methods and never the twain shall meet? Pragmatism and purism 
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As noted, mixed-method research is highly contested. At the heart of this 
contestation, is the commensurability question surrounding paradigms. For one family 
of researchers, paradigms are “commensurable; that is, they are retrofitted to each 
other in ways that make simultaneous practice of both possible” (Lincoln et al., 2011, 
p. 169). Such a family, or position, that argues paradigms are commensurable has 
been termed pragmatism. In physical therapy, as Shaw et al. (2010) noted, 
“pragmatism provides a strategy to integrate principles from each of a critical, 
interpretive, and scientific/positivist paradigm to more optimally inform practice” (p. 
512). Pragmatism has it historical roots in the ideas of John Dewey and others, and in 
relation to mixed methods favours a ‘what-works’ approach to develop better 
understandings of phenomena. It attends, as Shaw et al. proposed, to the practical 
nature of reality, finding truth in the solutions of problems, and discovering the 
consequences of actions and objects. They suggested that pragmatism permits the use 
of many different methods to obtain knowledge claims that have utility in informing 
physical therapy practice, as it takes the research question, or the problem, as the most 
important determinant of the research design. Mixed methods research allows the 
integration of analytical results from both qualitative and quantitative data collection 
methods into convergent conclusions for a research study. Shaw et al. further argued 
that this combination of qualitative and quantitative lines of inquiry through a 
pragmatist position permits a more comprehensive approach to a research question 
that is based on the complexity and context of physical therapy practice.  
Also within physical therapy similar points were made by Rauscher and 
Greenfield (2009) in relation to mixed methods research. For them, “Careful 
consideration and explicit articulation of a project’s purpose constitutes the first step 
in deciding on a mixed methods plan” (emphasis added; p. 93). Next, they proposed 
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that, in mixed-methods research the researcher must make three key decisions before 
deciding which design strategy is most appropriate for a project. They are (1) the 
priority given to the quantitative and qualitative methods and data, (2) the sequence of 
implementation of methods for data collection, and (3) the phases in which the data 
and findings will be integrated. Rauscher and Greenfield then added, “Underlying the 
choices regarding each of these factors is the aim of the overall project” (p. 93). In 
such ways, as Bryman (2007) noted, “epistemological and ontological issues have 
been marginalized to a significant extent as pragmatism has emerged as a major 
orientation to combining quantitative and qualitative research” (p. 17).  
Accordingly, for pragmatists, the basic differences between paradigms are 
deemed commensurable. As a consequence, the epistemological and ontological 
differences between paradigms do not really matter. What matters for proponents of a 
pragmatist position instead is the purpose of the research and the methods used to 
meet it.  
However, for others termed purists, when it comes to the mixing of methods, 
epistemology and ontology do matter. For those that adopt a purist position, a 
pragmatic position to mixed-methods is deeply questionable as different paradigms 
are incommensurable. For example, post-positivists contend that because the whole 
point of research is the pursuit of truth (however difficult it is to get at) then if true 
from false knowledge claims cannot be sorted out, then there is no point to doing 
social research. One key way to sort out trustworthy from untrustworthy claims, and 
to validate research for the post-positivists, is through the proper use of methods as 
these are objective or can get us to close to the reality as it truly is (Smith, 1993).  
However, the interpretivists counter this. For them, methods are not neutral or 
objective but instead are themselves a product of social and cultural influences 
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(Sparkes, & Smith, 2009; Smith, 2009). MacKenzie (1981) argued that even statistics, 
seemingly most neutral/objective tool in the social researchers bag, are socially 
constructed within the context of certain value orientations to accomplish particular 
goals (see pp.153-182 for MacKenzie’s discussion of the dispute between Pearson and 
Yule on different interests-different statistics). Thus, for the interpretivists, methods 
cannot sort out trustworthy from untrustworthy claims (as post-positivists desire). 
This doesn’t though mean people can stop talking about truth and so on. They can 
continue to talk about the truth but, for interpretivists, as long as it is recognized that 
the concept is a matter of time and place contingent agreement and not one that can be 
referenced to depicting reality as it really is (Smithh, 1993; Smith & Deemer, 2000).  
In addition to these tensions over what methods can achieve, for purists the 
issue of commensurability cannot be swept under the carpet as to do so risks the 
methods tail wagging the dog. For purists, methods are simply methods. They are 
practical ways to help construct meaningful realities. Following the logic of 
justification, what matters are not can methods be mixed, but rather the researchers’ 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that these techniques, procedures, and 
strategies are based on (Smith, 1993; Smith, 2007). In other words, paradigmatic 
questions concerning ontology and epistemology matter because they underpin 
methods, coming then before, and always informing, issues such as the study’s 
purpose, or which design strategy is most appropriate for a project. Given this, for 
purists, researchers must take epistemology and ontology very seriously. They cannot 
be brushed under the carpet. 
Furthermore, the mixing of methods in one project is problematic for purists 
when critical realist researchers are added into the mixture of post-positivist 
quantitative and interpretivist qualitative research. For instance, with respect to 
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ontological differences between interpretivism and post-positivism or critical realism, 
on the side of the latter two paradigms there is the claim that there must be something 
outside of ourselves - an independently existing social reality - which researchers can 
call upon to sort out different claims to knowledge. The interpretivists argue back that 
the ultimate implication of no theory-free knowledge is that social reality cannot 
accomplish the task required of it by post-positivists; once one climbs aboard the train 
of a fallible epistemology there is, as Smith (1993) put it, no station at which to get 
off that can be anything more than arbitrarily chosen. Thus, for the interpretivist their 
ontological position would be considered incommensurable with the post-positivist or 
critical realist view of reality. 
The interpretivist would also likely to be unconvinced by the critical realist 
attempt to couple together a dualist/objective/transcendental/neorealist ontology with 
a constructionist epistemology and thereby salvage, as interpretivists see it, some 
remnants of the empiricist project (Smith & Deemer, 2000). The dual commitment to, 
on the one hand, believing there is an independent existing reality out there that at 
least in principle can be known and, on the other hand, the idea that we can never 
know if we have depicted this reality as it really is, for interpretivists, an untenable 
position. That is to say, for the interpretivist, a critical realist cannot have it both 
ways. Such a balancing act between believing there is a reality independent of them 
that in principle can be known as it is whilst also saying that knowledge is social 
constructed is philosophically not tenable (see Smith & Deemer, 2000). To escape this 
untenable position, the critical realist researcher has eventually to go in one of two 
directions, the interpretivist would argue. Either the critical realist must allow their 
ontology of realism to override their interpretivist epistemology of constructionism, or 
they accept that interpretivism looms far larger in their formulations that they realize 
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or would desire (Smith & Deemer, 2000; Sparkes & Smith, 2009). In accepting this, 
they end up very much looking very much like an interpretivist, not a critical realist. 
Critical realists would however disagree. They might say that in practice they are 
committed to the idea there is a reality physical out there independent of their 
knowledge of it. But in the same breath they state they’re equally committed to the 
idea that they can never know if, or, when, they have accurately depicted that reality. 
There is no big problem with this. It works, and it is good science. But no matter who 
is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, we still arrive back at the same issue. There is 
incommensurability between the critical realists and the interpretivists. This can also 
deepen when the goals of the research and the researcher role are examined.  
The goal of inquiry for the post-positivist is ‘prediction and control’, for the 
interpretivist and critical realist it’s ‘understanding the natural setting’, and for the 
critical participatory inquirer it is about ‘empowerment and emancipation’. Further, 
the researcher’s role within post-positivist quantitative research is that of 
‘disinterested scientist’ whereas for the qualitative researcher who subscribes to 
interpretivism or critical realism the same role becomes that of ‘passionate 
participant’. Thus, adding further difficulty to integrating paradigms is the 
researcher’s role. In critical participatory inquiry the role is of a ‘transformative 
intellectual’ who operates as an advocate and an activist. Accordingly, how can a 
researcher be in one mixed methods study simultaneously all disinterested, passionate, 
and morally implicated in not just the research, but producing change too? How can 
they at once seek to control, understand, and emancipate? For purists, this is all 
problematic. Or, at the very least, mixed methods researchers grounded in pragmatism 
have yet to provide convincing arguments as well as practical examples in action as to 
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how this can all be done. Incommensurability is, in other words, still an important 
matter. 
This is supported by Lincoln (2010). Although she is not against utilizing a 
variety of methods when appropriate to accomplish some purpose, and has done so 
countless times, she does have concerns about mixing paradigms or metaphysical 
models. This is particularly so when the simplistic declaration is made by some mixed 
methods advocates that one’s philosophical belief system are deemed meaningless or 
irrelevant. For her, the research we do is always already theory laden. Therefore, 
efforts to claim that it is not, by arguing that incommensurability is not an issue if one 
just declares themselves as a pragmatist, “are both naive and fraudulent...We do not 
do ourselves, or our work, or our students any service when we fail to make the 
premises, assumptions and paradigmatic bases of our work clear, or worse yet, 
pretend we have no premises, assumptions, or paradigmatic bases” (p. 7). 
According to Lincoln (2010), the espoused pragmatism of the mixed-methods 
approach that argues that philosophies, paradigms and metaphysics do not matter, 
might well be part of a larger group who seek to surveil, contain and discipline 
qualitative research. Her argument with the mixed-methods theorists is not that they 
mix methods but that the pragmatism claimed by some of them rests at the enacted 
level only. As such, “The mixed methods pragmatists tell us nothing about their 
ontology or epistemology or axiological position” (p. 7). Yet as Lincoln emphasizes, 
paradigms and metaphysical do matter. 
They matter because they tell us something important about researcher 
standpoint. They tell us something about the researcher’s proposed 
relationship to the Other(s). They tell us something about what the researcher 
thinks counts as knowledge, and who can deliver the most valuable slice of 
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this knowledge. They tell us how the researcher intends to take account of 
multiples and contradictory values she will encounter. (Emphasis in original; 
Lincoln, 2010, p. 7.) 
 It would appear that for pragmatists paradigms are commensurable. But for 
purists they are incommensurable. Thus, the purist mixed method researcher needs to 
grapple with, rather than sidestep, some important matters about epistemology and 
ontology. The contested nature of mixed methods is given extra force when one 
considers the following arguments. First, methods don’t emerge out of thin air. They 
are informed by, and extend out of, particular theoretical sensibilities. Thus, theory is 
also vital when considering mixed methods research. As Silverman (2000) put it, 
“neither quality nor choice of method is ever purely a technical matter. Our theoretical 
orientation, whether explicit or implicit, is what drives our research” (p. 283). This 
has some significant implications for researchers seeking to mix methods whilst 
minimizing the importance of theory. 
As case in point it would be untenable to mix qualitative methods informed by 
a discursive theoretical sensibilities (Potter & Hepburn, 2008) with a quantitative 
study grounded in cognitive theories (e.g. self-determination theory). This is because 
the former critiques cognitive views of science. A discursive qualitative researcher 
takes a radically different approach to understanding human lives in which, for 
instance, attitudes about engaging in rehabilitation are not held in a person’s head as 
cognitivism would theorize them, but instead performed in interaction with physical 
therapists. Given this, to ignore or relegate theory, to simply brush these aside because 
they interfere with a ‘what works approach’, is problematic for s purist. An untenable 
position is produced when mixed methods research is based on different/competing 
ontological, epistemological or theoretical foundations and, as such, serious doubts 
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are raised about the legitimacy of the research, how results can be theoretically 
interpreted in a plausible and coherent manner, and, for example, how one assesses 
the quality (e.g., credibility, trustworthiness, validity) of mixed methods research.  
Second, researchers, like Bryman (2007) and Coleman, Guo, and Dabbs 
(2007), have seen little evidence of mixed methods researchers genuinely integrating 
their findings, or paying sufficient attention to the writing up of qualitative research 
findings in nuanced ways. One consequence of this is what Hesse-Biber (2010) 
described as ‘methodological orthodoxy’. For her, this orthodoxy currently favours, 
“quantitative methodologies, with a mixed methods praxis that positions qualitative 
methods second and quantitative methods as primary with an overall mixed methods 
design that is in the service of testing out quantitatively generated theories about the 
social world” (p. 455). In favouring quantitative methods, qualitative research is thus 
not given equal status. There is as a consequence the danger of this kind of research 
being seen as ‘second class’ in the research community or reduced to a method that 
services the needs of more important quantitative methods.  
In a similar vein, Denzin (2010) argued that, with few exceptions, the mixed 
methods discourses have been shaped by a community of post-positivistic scholars 
who have moved back and forth between quantitative and qualitative research 
frameworks. Along the way, he suggested, they have found utility in qualitative 
methodologies and have sought to bring them into studies that are most often framed 
by the use of quantitative, experimental, or survey methods. He noted that seldom 
have these scholars been trained in, or identified with, qualitative methodologies and 
yet these same people are now seeking to determine and distort how qualitative work 
is conducted via a discourse that introduces and validates a post-positivistic language. 
For him, this language says that anybody can use any method because methods are 
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simply tools rather than forms of performative and interpretive practice. He 
concluded: “Unlike the poaching of animals, there is nothing illegal about 
methodological poaching, but it does have some negative consequences” (p. 420). 
Conclusions 
So, where does all this leave physical therapists interested in mixed methods 
research and qualitative research in particular? For us, like Lincoln (2010), it leaves 
us with a belief that paradigms do matter. But, this does not mean that mixing 
methods should never be done; they can. Our point is that researchers, including those 
in physical therapy, need to grapple with some very complex issues if they are to 
advocate or engage in mixed methods research. Indeed, little is said about how 
“pragmatism provides a strategy to integrate principles from each of a critical, 
interpretive, and scientific/positivist paradigm to more optimally inform practice” 
(Shaw et al., 2010, p. 512). Detailed discussions from pragmatists within physical 
therapy about how and why paradigms are commensurable are still lacking. Equally, 
purists in physical therapy might in the future consider discussing mixed methods 
from a different angle. For example, a discussion might revolve around how and why 
methods can be mixed whilst ensuring – if possible - paradigmatic commensurability. 
Discussion is also needed on the thorny issues surrounding the holy trinity of validity, 
generalizability, and reliability (see Sparkes & Smith, forthcoming). 
As part of all this, researchers within physical therapy would do well to 
assume the responsibility to listen carefully, and to attempt to grasp what is being 
expressed and said in different positions so that informed discussions can develop. In 
many ways, then, this is a call for the qualities of connoisseurship. For Eisner (1991), 
this involves the ability to make fine-grained discriminations among complex and 
subtle qualities, “Connoisseurship is the art of appreciation.  It can be displayed in any 
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realm in which the character, import, or value of objects, situations, and performances 
is distributed and variable” (p. 63). He emphasized that the term appreciation should 
not be conflated with ‘a liking for’.  
There is no necessary relationship between appreciating something and liking 
it. To appreciate the qualities of wine, a book, or a school means to experience 
the qualities that constitute each and to understand something about them. It 
also includes making judgements about their value. One can appreciate the 
weaknesses of an argument, a teacher, or a poem as well as their strengths. 
Nothing in connoisseurship as a form of appreciation requires that our 
judgements be positive. What is required (or desired) is that our experience be 
subtle, complex, and informed. (Eisner, 1991, pp. 68-69) 
We hope this paper has helped in the process of connoisseurship. Of course, 
connoisseurship is not easy. As part of the process, researchers need to risk one’s 
prejudices and, equally, be open to be persuaded. But, for us, this is a moral 
obligation. A dialogue around the use of mixed-methods is vital to the goal of raising 
researcher self-awareness as well as to the future development of mixed methods 
research in physical therapy. We would hope that this paper has encouraged such a 
dialogue.  
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